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Analysing public service outsourcing: The value of a regulatory perspective 
Abstract 
This article draws on findings from two longitudinal case studies of voluntary organisations 
engaged in delivering social care services via purchaser ± provider relations with local 
authorities. The study focuses on changes to contractual relations, employment conditions in 
provider organisations and service quality. The article argues the influence of the market 
on these changes can only be adequately comprehended by rooting the analysis in an 
understanding of the way in which surrounding regulatory frameworks shape its 
structure and operation. In doing so, it reveals how in an era of shifting market conditions 
characterised by greater competition and dramatic local authority cuts, DµVRIW¶UHJXODWRU\
framework offers little support to partnership relations between voluntary organisations and 
local authorities. Instead, the regulatory environment undermines financial security among 
voluntary organisations, degrades employment conditions in them and raises concerns 
regarding their service quality. 
 
Regulation, social care, outsourcing, employment conditions, voluntary organisations 
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the way in which regulatory frameworks shape the 
structure and operation of the Scottish social care market place and hence influence purchaser 
± provider relations between local authorities and voluntary sector providers of social care. 
Previous studies have pointed towards how New Public Management (NPM) has shaped 
social care markets and thereby prompted detrimental changes to the terms and conditions of 
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employment of workers in voluntary sector providers due to competition and pressures on 
public sector budgets and price. The same studies have highlighted more tentatively 
subsequent detrimental consequences for service quality outcomes (Baines, 2004: 
Cunningham, 2008: Cunningham and James, 2011).  
 
Using a longitudinal analysis of two voluntary sector organisations, this paper provides a 
different conceptual lens through which to explore the employment outcomes flowing from 
purchaser-provider relations in social care. In particular, it adopts a framework of analysis 
under which public service outsourcing is conceptualised as a µUHJXODWRU\¶ as well as a 
µPDUNHW¶ process. That is an approach which recognises the value of theoretical perspectives 
which acknowledge that the advance of the market does not wholly replace state regulation 
but rather involves a reconfiguration of regulatory roles, forms and relationships in a way that 
enhances the position of some (market-based) actors and reduces that of others (MacKenzie 
and Martinez-Lucio, 2004 and 2005). In adopting this conceptual framework, the paper has 
three main concerns. The first is to explore how market mechanisms and regulation have 
changed the economic fortunes of voluntary sector organisations. The second is to 
investigate the implications of these changing fortunes for employment relationships in 
voluntary organisations. Finally, the last is to examine the degree to which they are 
associated with detrimental changes to service quality. 
 
This article proceeds through four inter-related stages. It commences with a two-part 
literature section. The first part of this provides a summary of the theoretical framework of 
this paper while the second uses this framework to explore the development and nature of the 
regulatory infrastructure governing the product and labour markets surrounding social care 
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outsourcing. The next section then outlines the method. This is followed by the findings of 
longitudinal case studies in two Scottish voluntary sector care providers. The findings shed 
light on provider experiences of the contracting market place and its implications both for the 
employment conditions of their staff and, more tentatively, service quality. Finally, there is a 
discussion of the inter-connections between these findings and the surrounding regulatory 
infrastructure for adult social care and the light these shed on the value of utilising the SDSHU¶V 
analytical framework. 
 
Purchaser ± provider relations in public services ± the continuing relevance of 
regulation in shaping market outcomes 
Over the last three decades new public management has dominated thinking concerning the 
delivery of public services (Pollit, 1995). NPM identifies market relations, and related modes 
of production through purchaser ± provider splits, as the most efficient approach to delivering 
public services (Mohammed, 2010). Following the logic of conventional market economics, 
it is argued that quality and pricing concerns in service delivery will both be maximised if 
potential providers have to compete for the right deliver services (Bailey and Davidson, 
1999). In addition, efficiencies are seen to arise via YROXQWDU\RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶responses to 
threats of market entry and replacement of existing providers by alternative agencies. 
Moreover, undermine opportunities for public sector bureaucrats and their representatives to 
maximise their personal gains from surplus budgets, (Mohammed, 2010). This last strand of 
analysis reflects public choice theory. This theory argues market forces would act to reduce 
the ability of public sector staff to be insulated from supply and demand dynamics through 
being employed on nationally negotiated terms and conditions in a context where reliance 
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was placed on internal labour markets to ensure the requisite supply of skills (Buchanan, 
1972).  
 
This characterisation of market relations shaping public service delivery cannot, however, 
ignore the continued influence of regulation in such outcomes. As the above studies 
themselves suggest, local authorities do not abdicate all responsibility for delivery as they 
mediate service user preferences and further redefine and oversee the roles and 
responsibilities of providers through contracting and accountability regimes (Mohammed, 
2010). Moreover, local authorities themselves are subject to certain central government 
controls (Bailey and Davidson, 1999). 
 
This continuing multi-level activity by the state challenges simplistic assertions about its 
declining regulatory role and its increasing replacement by the µPDUNHW¶ as a source of 
economic and political decision-making (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2014; Martinez 
Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004;  MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005). Drawing upon 
broadly-based conceptualisations of regulation that encompass µDOO mechanisms of social 
control ± LQFOXGLQJ««QRQ-state SURFHVVHV«¶ (Baldwin et al, 1998: 4), Martinez-Lucio and 
MacKenzie have emphasised the need to move beyond a zero sum approach to the evaluation 
of shifts in regulatory policy based on a simple dichotomous distinction between µUHJXODWLRQ¶ 
and µGHUHJXODWLRQ¶. Instead, they have advocated a perspective which focusses on how 
regulation moves across different regulatory sites, spaces, levels and actors as the State 
withdraws from, or engages in, particular forms of direct intervention in social economic 
affairs. For MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio (2004 and 2005) the advance of the µPDUNHW¶ 
should therefore be seen as the product of the state acting to re-configure regulatory roles, 
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forms and relationships in a way that enhances the position of some (market-based) actors 
and reduces that of others through often simultaneous processes of de- and re-regulation. 
Moreover, this process of re-configuration should be viewed as inherently political and hence 
potentially unstable because of its vulnerability to attack from vested interests and pressures 
for reform on the grounds of their failure to perform in line with expectations. 
 
The framework of analysis offered by Mckenzie and Martinez Lucio provides a potentially 
valuable lens from which to analyse processes of public service outsourcing. This is because 
it encompasses two important related strands of analysis. Firstly, the analysis draws attention 
to the socially constructed nature of markets (Polanyi, 1957; Fligstein, 1996; Bres and Gond, 
2014, and highlights the way in which the nature and operation of purchaser ± provider 
relationships are influenced by surrounding social norms and institutions, including legally 
based ones (see e.g. Marchington and Vincent, 2004). Secondly, the framework enables these 
lines of analysis to be combined and explored in a detailed and rigorous way. In particular, by 
highlighting how roles and responsibilities within a regulatory space are distributed across a 
variety of actors, exist at different levels and take different forms, the approach provides a 
platform facilitating more in-depth examinations of the nature of public service markets and 
the factors influencing their operation. 
 
In what follows the argument that public service outsourcing can usefully be conceptualised 
as a µUHJXODWRU\¶, rather than just a µPDUNHW¶, process is explored in relation to the structure 
and operation of the outsourcing of adult social care services in Britain.  
The social care market and its regulation  
The British social care market was created as part of the dismantling of the institutions and 
regulatory apparatus of Keynesianism. This dismantling followed New Right critiques of the 
6 
 
failure of Keynesian welfare provision and deteriorating public services (Thompson, 2007). 
The neo-liberal inspired response to these critiques was to favour, where possible, cheaper 
DQGPRUHHIILFLHQWVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQYLD130LQYROYLQJWKHVWDWH¶VSKDVHGZLWKGUDZDOIURP
the delivery of services and its role as a direct employer (see e.g. Entwistle, 2005; Walker and 
Ling, 2002). In its place came the establishment of markets made up of independent 
subcontracted organisations from the private and non-profit sectors. (Crouch, 2011: Martin, 
2011): a process of marketization that has resulted in the majority of residential and 
domiciliary care being outsourced (Hughes et al, 2009).  
In line with the analysis of Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio, however, this withdrawal of the 
state from social care delivery has not comprised a form of zero-sum deregulation. Rather, it 
has involved the transferring of regulatory functions to other sites, spaces and actors and 
accorded a greater regulatory role to forms of private product and labour market regulation. 
The operation of these private forms of regulation have, however, continued to be µIUDPHG¶
by established and new regulatory decisions taken at the level of the state (see e.g. Mackenzie 
and Martinez-Lucio, 2004; Hoggett, 1996). Consequently, they have been associated with the 
establishment of a regulatory infrastructure that combines together elements of both public 
and private regulation (see e.g. Locke et al, 2013). 
7KLVFRQWLQXLQJSXEOLFUHJXODWLRQHPERGLHVHOHPHQWVRIERWKµKDUG¶DQGµVRIW¶ODZDQGDFWVWR
impose responsibilities and expectations on both local authorities, as the commissioners of 
services, and provider organisations, in their capacity as both employers and the deliverers of 
services.  With regard to local authorities, many outsourced services fall within the scope of 
their mandatory powers and responsibilities to deliver services relating to child and adult 
protection and the management of managing high risk offenders. Care governance 
arrangements in Scotland require, for example, each local authority to appoint a Chief Social 
Work Officer (CSWO), who must hold a social work qualification. The CSWOs are 
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accountable to the Chief Executive and elected members of local authorities for the discharge 
of the laid down statutory service obligations. In this capacity, they have overall 
responsibility for social work practice and standards± whether provided directly by the local 
authority or in partnership with private or voluntary agencies (Social Work Scotland, 2013). 
As a consequence, the governance of outsourced services has come under the auspices of 
legally binding contracts and strict performance criteria (Crouch, 2011: Martin, 2011). 
6XFKµKDUGODZ¶GULYHQFRQWUDFWXDOLVDWLRQKDVH[LVWHGDORQJVLGHPRUHGLUHFWJRYHUQPHQWDO
attempts to influence the contracting practices of local authorities. The period of New 
Labour rule saw changes made to the regulatory space of local government 
procurement to introduce greater stability and predictability in the market and thereby 
counter perceived problems with the operation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) during the Thatcher and Major governments (Bailey and Davidson, 1999: 
Kendall, 2003). In particular, there was a perception that while the calls for cost cutting 
and efficiencies associated with market reforms were being achieved, the accompanying 
improvements in service quality were less apparent (Smith, 1999). 1HZ/DERXU¶Vchanges 
encompassed the introduction of a Best Value regime intended to ensure that issues of 
quality, as well as cost, are taken into account when awarding public service work, and to 
encourage mutuality among the various stakeholders (Roper, et al, 2005: Higgins, et al, 
2004). They also involved the introduction of a number of VRIWHUµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶procurement 
processes (Davies, 2011). Reflecting 1HZ/DERXU¶VHPSKDVLVRQSDUWQHUVKLSDQGTXDOLW\RI
services, these notably included the advocacy of longer-term contracts and hence funding, the 
DZDUGRIµIXOOFRVWUHFRYHU\¶DQGWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIYROXQWDU\VHFWRUSURYLGHUVLQWKH
specification of the services to be contracted (HM Treasury, 2002; Home Office, 2005; 
Office of the Third Sector, 2006).  
8 
 
For their part, care service providers are the subject of detailed (and changing) statutory 
requirements relating to their registration as care organisations, as well as the standards of 
care they provide (Care Quality Commission, 2010).1 These standards are process and 
performance based in nature and reflective of the international trend towards reflexive, self-
UHJXODWLRQWKDWSODFHOHVVUHOLDQFHRQµFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶VW\OHSUHVFULSWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWV
(see e.g. Braithwaite, 1985; and Short and Toffel, 2010). Compliance with them is monitored 
by a regulatory agency, the Care Quality Commission, that is armed with an array of 
enforcement powers, including prosecutions and inspections, and which rates the quality of 
services so inspected, currently on a four-point scale ranging from inadequate, through 
µUHTXLUHVLPSURYHPHQW¶ and good, to outstanding.2 
Labour market reforms have meanwhile both enhanced and constrained the employment 
policies and practices of providers. In the case of the former, this freedom has been provided 
by undermining the legitimacy and regulatory reach of trade unions over the terms and 
conditions of employment offered to staff (Cunningham and James, 2007) as a result of the 
actions taken during the period of Thatcher government to repeal Schedule 11 of the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 under the Employment Act 1980 and rescind, in 1983, the 
long-standing Fair Wages Resolution.  
The Fair Wages Resolution (FWR) required those contracting with government departments 
IRUWKHVXSSO\RIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVWRµSD\UDWHVRIZDJHVDQGREVHUYHKRXUVDQGFRQGLWLRQV
of labour no less favourable¶than those laid down under [essentially multi-employer] 
collective agreements in the relevant trade or industry for the district where the work was 
FDUULHGRXW¶%HUFXVVRQ,WIXUWKHUVWLSXODWHGWKDWLQWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKWUDGHRU
industry based provisions, those provided should EHQROHVVIDYRXUDEOHµWKDQWKHJHQHUDOOHYHO
of wages, hours and conditions observed by other employers whose general circumstances in 
WKHWUDGHRULQGXVWU\LQZKLFKWKHFRQWUDFWRULVHQJDJHGDUHVLPLODU¶ Furthermore, by virtue of 
9 
 
Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act 1975, its requirements were effectively 
extended across the whole economy through provisions which enabled complaints to be 
EURXJKWRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWDQHPSOR\HUZDVIDLOLQJWRREVHUYHµUHFRJQLVHGWHUPVDQG
FRQGLWLRQV¶RUZKHUHQRVXFKSURYLVLRQVH[LVWHGUHOHYDQWµJHQHUDO¶RQHV:RRG7KH
removal of these provisions served to avoid the potential difficulties they created for external, 
and often non-unionised, providers who wanted to depart significantly from the terms and 
conditions negotiated nationally in the local authority sector (Cunningham, 2008: Atkinson 
and Lucas, 2013).  
 
However, echoing the argument that processes of marketization and NPM are invariably 
accompanied by degrees of re-regulation (Bach and Given, 2010), aspects of provider 
employment practices continue to be the subject of sector-specific government regulation. In 
order to ensure the supply of appropriately skilled labour, mandatory qualification standards 
have been specified based on the systems of National and Scottish Vocational Qualifications 
(Gospel and Lewis, 2011). Tighter controls have been exerted over recruitment through the 
introduction of criminal disclosure regulations (Cunningham, 2008). Reflecting the different 
levels at which regulation can occur (Majone,1994), providers have also been obliged to 
honour the terms and conditions of staff transferred to them from local authorities (or for that 
matter other employers) under the terms of successive TUPE regulations that are themselves 
the product of a European directive (Cavalier and Arthur, 2006; Arthur, 2014). In addition, 
during the period 2003 - 2010, these provisions were temporarily supplemented by a  code of 
practice which provided for staff working alongside transferred local authority personnel to 
be SURYLGHGZLWKµQROHVVIDYRXUDEOH¶WHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV3.  
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The current regulatory infrastructure relating to the outsourcing of British social care services 
is, then, the product of elements of state driven de-regulation and re-regulation which have 
served to create  a meta-framework that simultaneously enables and constrains macro-level 
regulatory activity on the part of service commissioners and providers. The evolution of this 
framework has clearly been informed by a belief among successive governments as to the 
desirability of transferring service delivery responsibilities to private and voluntary sector 
organisations (Davies, 2011). Beyond this, however, it can be seen to have emerged from a 
series of relatively ad hoc policy initiatives. These initiatives have been informed by a 
combination of shifting ideologically and philosophical principles, and more pragmatic 
actions aimed at addressing perceived weaknesses in preceding ones against the backcloth of 
trying to minimise tensions between the potentially contradictory objectives of improving 
cost-effectiveness and the quality of service provision. (Hood and Dixon, 2013). 
The resulting meta-framework for the regulation of social care outsourcing is consequently 
best viewed as representing a temporary, or transitory, regulatory settlement. It is also one 
that embodies contradictory and mutually supporting elements. Local authorities retain 
responsibility for the adequate delivery of a set of mandatory services and are required to 
commission them in a way that strikes an appropriate balance between cost and quality 
considerations. Beyond this, they possess considerable discretion as to how they seek to 
FRPPLVVLRQVHUYLFHVJLYHQWKHLUHIIHFWLYHDELOLW\WRLJQRUHµVRIW¶SROLF\SUHVFULSWLRQVLQWKH
area. In particular, WKH\KDYHQRµKDUG¶VWDWXWRU\REOLJDWLRQVWRIXQGVHUYLFHVDWDSDUWLFXODU
level and to therefore resource services at a level that enables providers to comply with the 
detailed performance standards imposed on them. Providers meanwhile possess considerable 
legal freedom to re-shape their employment strategies to accommodate financial pressures 
arising from local authority funding decisions but also face potentially serious contractual and 
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statutory penalties if they fail to meet laid down standards pertaining to the quality of 
services. 
These configurations of public and private regulation governing labour and product markets 
in social care raise three important questions concerning their operation and outcomes. First, 
how do market mechanisms and regulation change the economic fortunes of voluntary 
sector organisations, and which of them are the most influential? Secondly, what are the 
implications for employment relationships in voluntary organisations of these changing 
fortunes? Finally, to what degree do they appear to be associated with detrimental 
changes to service quality? Our case study data is now used to shed light on these 
questions.  
Method 
7KHWZRYROXQWDU\VHFWRUFDVHRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWKLVVWXG\DUHGUDZQIURP6FRWODQG¶Vadult 
social care market. Details of the field work are provided in Table 1. In each case interviews 
in the organisations were first conducted in 2002 and then followed up in 2008/9 and again in 
2011 and 2014.Those interviewed comprised human resource and senior operational 
managers (18 interviews in total). Where possible, the research aimed to secure a degree of 
continuity among respondents across the periods of data collection. In Case 1 from 2009 to 
2014 the same HR Manager was interviewed, as well as the operational manager between 
2009 and 2011. In Case 2 interviews were held with the same HR Manager throughout the 
four phases, but there were different respondents in the other interviews. The two case 
studies therefore relied exclusively on management respondents, a feature that it is 
acknowledged means that they necessarily provide only a partial insight into the 
working lives of employees in the sector. This partial analysis also means we have no 
insights into the degree to which changes to employment conditions impact on issues 
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such as worker morale, and thus contribute to quitting, with possible implications for 
service quality. 
In the first interviews in 2002 respondents were asked to outline the changes to the regulatory 
and funding environment confronting their organisation over the previous three years and 
discuss its employment implications. Subsequently, the follow-up interviews addressed the 
same issues, but with a greater focus on the changes occurring in contractual relationships 
with local authority service commissioners and the employment-related implications flowing 
from them. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, lasted for between 45 minutes to one 
hour and were transcribed verbatim. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Below the collected data are used initially to examine what they tells us about the evolution 
and operation of the social care product market and its impact on the financial status of the 
two voluntary organisations. Following this, attention turns to a consideration of how its 
operation has prompted changes to the working conditions of those working in the two case 
study organisations, and the implications of these changes for service delivery. 
Markets, regulation and the economic fortunes of voluntary sector organisations 
 
The initial interviews conducted at the commencement of the research in 2001 confirmed that 
the two case study organisations were strongly engaged in bidding for outsourced work from 
local authorities. Indeed, they revealed them to be highly dependent on such work for their 
financial survival.  
In case 1 it was reported that from 2001 onwards the increased marketization and outsourcing 
of care had enabled the organisation to emerge from a period of financial problems in the late 
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1990s into an era of income and employment growth through the taking on of new contracts. 
This picture of financial recovery and expansion contrasted with a situation of essentially 
ongoing stability in case 2 that was marked by an absence of significant financial problems 
and a good deal of continuity in service provision. Although, as in case 1, interviewees did 
LQGLFDWHWKDWUHODWLRQVZLWKIXQGHUVZHUHYDULDEOHZLWKVRPHEHLQJRQO\RID\HDU¶VGXUDWLRQ
TXLWHGLVWDQWDQGIDOOLQJVKRUWRIµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶FRPPLVVLRQLQJ)RUH[DPSOH it was noted 
how local authority officials at times attempted to impose uplifts with little negotiation and 
irrespective of whether these covered increases in costs by ± µhiding behind letters or emails¶
(Director of Care Services). 
 
Local authorities say µZHZLOOJLYH\RXDSHUFHQWDJHULVHRIZKDWRQ\RXUVDODU\
costs, but no other. So they are recognising that there is an increase in the cost, but 
LWGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\EDUHDQ\UHODWLRQWRZKDWZHSD\E\ZD\RILQFUHDVHVDODU\
costs (Finance Manager, case 2). 
 
 In fact, at times, the organisation was reported to have threatened to withdraw from service 
provision where the funding packages on offer were considered unsustainable. 
 
The ultimate sanction is calling off the service. So for us as an organisation we turn 
URXQGWRDORFDODXWKRULW\DQGVD\µZKDWDUHyou going to do with twenty severely 
disabled people? So that is the sanction and power that is the biggest power that we 
have as a negotiating tool (Director of Care Services. 
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By the time of the second round of interviews in 2008 the two organisations were reporting 
growing financial and competitive pressures as local authorities sought to address their own 
financial difficulties by reducing funding levels. These pressures had prompted both to 
devote attention to improving their capacity to compete for contracts. An HR interviewee in 
FDVHIRUH[DPSOHUHIHUUHGWRKRZPDQDJHPHQWKDGUHFRJQLVHGWKHQHHGWREHFRPHµWHQGHU
savv\¶DVORFDODXWKRULWLHVEHFDPHPRUHFRVWFRQVFLRXVDQGVRXJKWQHZSURYLGHUVLQWKH
market.  In a similar vein, in case 2 it was reported that a Business Development Manager 
(BDM) had been recruited with the task of pursuing opportunities for growth. 
A common theme emerging from the interviews was how the evolving social care market 
GHSDUWHGVLJQLILFDQWO\IURPWKHµVRIW¶UHJXODWRU\JRYHUQPHQWSUHVFULSWLRQVRIµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶
UHJDUGLQJORFDODXWKRULW\FRPPLVVLRQLQJµ)XOO-cost-UHFRYHU\¶ZDVRIWHQQRWprovided by 
funders, three year contracts remained relatively rare, and Best Value reviews of services 
were raising concerns because of their apparent cost-based nature, as the following quote 
illustrates. 
Some of our local authorities equate best value with cheapness. That is a thing we have to 
contend with, it can be another tool to drive costs down (Finance Officer Case 2). 
In case 1 this environment had already led to the loss of at least one service, as well as a 
failure to secure new work in several recent tenders. In case 2 it was similarly reported that 
the objective of securing income growth had proved extremely challenging as new market 
entrants included large American and European multinationals with a greater capacity to 
undertake tendering and the necessary accompanying relationship building with funders.  
The subsequent 2011 and 2014 interviews in case 1 revealed a further worsening financial 
situation brought on by emerging public expenditure cuts. Reference in this context was made 
to how relationships with funders were becoming less close as responsibility for tendering 
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processes was passed to specialist procurement teams and hence away from social service 
departments with whom close relationships had often been established. Providers also pointed 
to the changing way in which local authorities were using Approved Providers Lists (APLs). 
Previously APLs had been used to audit voluntary sector provider practices, including 
employment-related ones. By 2011, however, their usage had shifted towards a focus on 
reducing costs. In one case this had involved a reduction in the hourly rate (a figure that 
includes all employment costs, travel, management charges and costs of social and other 
activities for service users) from £18.00 to £14.00, and in others to calls from funders to 
make cuts of up to 7%. Meanwhile, in 2014 interviewees in both organisations reported that 
not only were local authority funding cuts continuing, but that commissioning authorities 
were no longer allowing them to contribute surpluses from relatively generous funding 
packages to reserves (as a contribution to potential redundancy payments). Instead, they were 
now claiming such money back. 
The third round of interviews revealed a further deterioration in the financial environment. As 
a result, the previous relative stability of case 2 had been transformed against the background 
of increasing losses on its care activities flowing from local authority funding cuts and 
freezes during the previous 18 months. In this period, the organisation had received increases 
in income from only two of the 22 local authorities for which it provided services. It was also 
receiving notifications from commissioners of cuts of around 5% for the forthcoming year.   
 
In this rapidly changing situation, the researchers were invited to undertake another interview 
as a further sharp financial shock occurred when one of cDVH¶VPDLQORFDODXWKRULW\FOLHQWV
imposed cuts amounting to £300,000 on its forthcoming budget. During this it emerged that 
there was a strong possibility of more cuts coming from other funders, and that these would 
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make the services concerned unsustainable since the scale of them meant that they could not 
be compensated for by drawing on financial reserves, as had previously been done.  
 
More widely, this 2014 interview revealed how case 2¶VVWUDWHJ\RIWU\LQJWRDWWUDFWH[WUD
income had not been successful. Efforts to promote and expand its services among some 
existing funders had led to some new small contracts. However, as the BDM reported, the 
organisation had chosen not to compete for recent retenders of services currently held by 
other providers as a consequence of fears that, if successful, it would be liable for expensive 
accrued pension rights under TUPE. It was also reported that over the previous 18 months 
persistent requests by the Director of Finance to meet with local authority officials to discuss 
the sustainability of services in the context of austerity measures had been consistently 
rebuffed. As a consequence, the organisation had launched a sustainability review of its care 
contracts.  
 
Changing Employment Conditions  
 
Tables 2 and 3 below summarise the main changes to staff terms and conditions made over 
the period covered by the different waves of interviews undertaken. As can be seen, they 
reveal overall processes of deterioration that broadly reflected the above fluctuating financial 
fortunes of the two organisations.   
In case 1, up until 1999 employees were paid salaries and conditions equivalent to public 
sector workers. However, from the late 1990s it was considered no longer financially viable 
to support these conditions and a radical reshaping of employment arrangements took place 
which involved the introduction of new pay scales, as well as more intensified working 
practices and increases in working hours. These changes were subsequently partially reversed 
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during the period of income growth that commenced from 2001 via efforts to match 
percentage pay rises given to local authority workers, an enhancement of family-friendly 
benefits above the statutory minimum, and a reduction in the working week. In contrast, the 
emerging financial difficulties highlighted in the 2009 interviews were reported to have led to 
further negative changes in employment conditions, including changes to pension 
arrangements, leading to three tiers of employer contributions ranging between 17% - 4%, the 
UHGXFWLRQRIVLFNQHVVHQWLWOHPHQWVWKURXJKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµZDLWLQJGD\V¶DORQJZLWKWKH
much more active management of sick leave absences, and a move away from previous 
efforts to award percentage pay increases similar to those received by local authority workers.  
 
We restricted pay rises last year and at the moment the decision of our board is to 
not to award one. We are to review that at the end of October, we have had to make 
other cuts and cut back dramatically on training on our SVQ activity and make a 
couple of posts redundant (Senior Manager, Case1). 
 
These adverse developments were later compounded by a range of further actions aimed at 
coping with post-2010, austerity driven, reductions in funding that encompassed the almost 
complete rolling back of the employment benefits accrued by staff over previous years and 
the imposition of substantial reductions in pay which, in the case of support workers, 
involved pay cuts of £2,000 per year.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Changes in employment conditions in case 2 similarly reflected its changing financial 
fortunes. As Table 3 shows, the first two phases of fieldwork in Case 2 revealed stability in 
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employment conditions, with pay and conditions linked to local authority scales. The 
organisation retained a good reputation in terms of training and developing staff, and, to 
retain a high skill mix, it had resisted employing low paid and skilled Support Assistants (as 
opposed to Support Workers). Some strains on employment conditions were though apparent, 
with references being made to recruitment freezes within particular local authority regions 
where relations were difficult and job losses stemming from cuts engendered by Best Value 
reviews. There were also pressures to reduce the proportion of expenditure devoted to 
project/line management salaries. 
 
They (local authorities) are putting a fair bit of pressure on us to bring the number 
of managers down. They have been trying to pressurise us to have only one 
manager between the two units (HR Manager, case 2). 
 
Subsequently, the 2011 and 2014 interviews revealed a picture of dramatic changes. Initially, 
the changes concerned involved a combination of pay freezes and benefit cuts, as well as a 
decision that in future the organisation would only provide training to meet minimum 
statutory requirements. In relation to the former, the newly promoted HR Director stated: 
 
Cost of living and increments we normally pay on WKHVWRI-XO\DQQXDOO\« but the 
assumption has been made that we won't be.  :H¶YHWROGVWDIIZH¶UHLQDUHDOO\GLIILFXOW
place financially. There is a pay freeze in terms of the cost of living award, and 
WKHUH¶VDOVRDSD\IUHH]HLQWHUPVRIWKHLQFUHPHQWVSHRSOHZRXOGQRUPDOO\H[SHFWWR
get. 
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Cuts in case 2 then came to encompass, in addition to job losses and resulting increases in 
work intensification for both frontline and back office personnel, the adoption of a policy to 
regrade support workers to the lower support assistant level, alongside similar moves to cut 
the pay of some management grades: reductions which involved the pay of support workers 
affected falling from between £15, 000 - £19,000 to £13, 000 to £14,000, and that of the 
managers concerned by £10,000 per annum (from £38,000 to £28,000). Cuts in services were 
also reported to be leading to some part-time workers experiencing reductions in working 
hours which, according to management respondents, meant that their wages barely covered 
living costs. 
 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
In large part, the recognised unions in both organisations struggled to head off such adverse 
changes to the employment conditions of their members when confronted with the realities of 
the surrounding market pressures. In case 1 union membership had historically struggled to 
grow over 50 percent. On the announcement of cuts in 2011, its membership initially 
increased, with the workforce refusing to accept the proposed changes and industrial action 
being considered. Eventually after negotiations, the changes were accepted in return for a 
management commitment to avoid compulsory redundancies.  Rather similarly, in Case 2, an 
initial failure to agree with the union had raised the prospect of industrial action occurring, 
with the union putting the organisation¶VSURSRVDOVWRDEDOORWEXWZLWKRXWUHFRPPHQGLQJ
acceptance. The resulting vote was in favour of accepting the proposals. Subsequently, the 
union experienced membership decline, along with the loss of several lay officials. 
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Market forces had therefore effectively supplanted internal regulation by collective 
bargaining in both organisations and in doing so acted to weaken local union organisation. It 
was apparent, however, that employee-employer relations had also deteriorated, with 
managers in both organisations reporting widespread staff discontent. Managers in Case 1, 
for example, observed that: 
 
There are a number of people who are feeling very aggrieved and it will be quite 
difficult to motivate and stimulate those people (Senior Operational Manager). 
 
Service viability and quality 
 
Such motivational challenges existed alongside more general concerns about the impact that 
the changes made to working conditions would have on the ability of the organisations to 
deliver services of an appropriate quality and to cope with the demands of competing for 
services in the changing market environment.  
 
In case 1, the reductions in training and alterations to the workforce skill mix brought about 
by the recruitment of cheaper support assistants were seen to have worrying implications for 
the capacity and expertise of front line staff. In addition, although respondents in the final 
LQWHUYLHZVGHVFULEHGWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDVµWHQGHUILW¶2SHUDWLRQDO0Dnager) and competitive 
on price, fears were voiced regarding the impact of the above changes on future recruitment.  
 
,ISHRSOHDUHFRPLQJLQIRUVXFKORZWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVZH¶UHQRWJRLQJWREHDEOHWR
recruit. (HR Manager). 
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Similarly, in Case 2 senior managers and members of the board were reported to be 
concerned about possible adverse consequences for service quality arising from the skill 
dilution associated with its greater reliance on support assistants and reductions in training. 
Indeed, the HR Manager anticipated a future downgrading of their services by the Care 
Quality Commission as a result of these changes. 
 
Concerns in Case 2 were also expressed about whether it would remain financially viable. 
For example, it was reported how the organisation had been unable to meet the request from 
one of its funders to meet the Scottish living wage (£7.85 per hour), and that in another local 
authority area the organisation was refusing new business opportunities because of 
recruitment problems linked to low pay. Wider still, cuts in management were seen to 
potentially have important implications for organisational efficiency at a time when some of 
its regions were experiencing increasing numbers of users managing their own social care 
budgets and acting as purchasers of services as a result of a government desire to encourage 
the greater personalisation of services (REF). These developments were viewed as 
challenging if existing users took their funding elsewhere, but also an opportunity if it meant 
more business. They were also generating uncertainties regarding staffing numbers, and what 
type of contract workers would be recruited on, i.e. temporary, permanent or zero-hours. 
Somewhat ironically, their successful exploitation was seen to require inputs from finance, 
marketing and HR functions which were already under pressure due to themselves having 
experienced significant staffing cuts. 
 
 
Discussion 
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The central objective of this paper has been to use the findings of two longitudinal case 
studies of voluntary organisations engaged in the delivery of outsourced social care services 
to explore the value of analysing such outsourcing through the lens of the regulatory 
perspective of Mackenzie and Martinez Lucio (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2014; 
Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004;  MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005). That is 
through a framework of analysis within which the use of market relations to replace the role 
of the state in public service delivery is viewed as a process of regulatory re-configuration 
rather than withdrawal. 
$VZDVQRWHGDWWKHSDSHU¶VRXWVHWWKHUHLVQRWKLQJQHZLQWKHLGHDWKDWPDUNHWVGRQRW
emerge spontaneously but rather are the product of social construction (Polanyi, 1957; 
Fligstein, 1996) and political decisions and actions (see e.g. Walker and Ling, 2002; Wang 
and Gooderham, 2014). The analysis offered by Mackenzie and Martinez Lucio, however, 
arguably provides a richer and more nuanced lens through which to understand the processes 
involved in such construction and the way in which they shape resultant market structures 
and outcomes. In this way, it can be argued to afford a means of moving beyond relatively 
static forms of institutional analysis that tend to treat regulation as an exogenous constraint 
and facilitator rather than as a factor that is intimately embedded in market structures as well 
as behaviours.   
7KLVVWXG\¶VILUVWTXHVWLRQZDVWRDVFHUWDLQhow market mechanisms and regulation change 
the economic fortunes of voluntary sector organisations. The presented findings point clearly 
to the fact that, even if, as in social care, public sector outsourcing occurs via deliberately 
created markets, those created do embody fundamental market dynamics whereby  buyers 
and sellers interact in situations of finite resources to reach agreements over the supply of 
goods and services. Thus, it was clear that real tensions and compromises over both price and 
quality issues marked the relationships existing between service commissioners and 
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providers. These relationships appeared to often be asymmetrically balanced towards the 
interests of the former, as a result of local authorities occupying monopsonistic market 
positions. At the same time, it was also clear that the use made of these advantageous market 
positions varied. Thus, while early interviews revealed variable purchaser ± provider 
relationships, ranging from the highly transactional (and financially stable) to the closely 
collaborative, later ones indicated that they were increasingly being used to impose funding 
cuts, with all that these meant for the financial security of provider organisations.   
Yet it was also clear from the undertaken interviews that the market exchanges reported by 
respondents were both directly and indirectly constrained and facilitated by the surrounding ± 
and constantly evolving - regulatory framework governing social care delivery. In the case of 
the former, and in addressing our question concerning quality, the care standards laid down 
and enforced by the Care Commission formed an important reference point for 
commissioners and providers as they sought to establish and maintain market relations. 
Indeed, they effectively formed the financial and ethical faultiness along which exchanges 
between funders and providers took place. This influence was not of a deterministic nature, 
however. Instead, it was apparent that the two sides frequently adopted differing 
interpretations of what constituted an appropriate level of service quality and what resources 
were needed to achieve it, as exemplified by reports of how the two case study organisations 
had chosen not to bid for work which in their view was inadequately funded.  
Meanwhile, although there was no doubt that the enforceable standards of the Care 
Commission did influence the funding decisions of local authorities, this was less the case 
with regard to the best commissioning practices promulgated by government, such as full cost 
recovery and the use of longer-term contracts. It appeared therefore that the soft, 
unenforceable nature of these prescriptions ± which it should be noted were introduced by the 
second Blair government and hence after the initiatives of the Thatcher/Major ones aimed at 
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encouraging the externalisation of public services ± tended to be sacrificed on the altar of 
more immediate financial and operational objectives. 
The second research question concerned the implications for employment relationships in 
voluntary organisations from these changing economic fortunes. The data revealed that the 
central way in which providers attempted to resolve the price-quality dilemmas confronting 
them was by revising their employment arrangements to reduce costs and increase efficiency. 
In both organisations, these revisions encompassed ongoing, and often dramatic, 
deteriorations in staff terms and conditions, as well redundancies, less expenditure on training 
and development and work intensification. Changes that echo those reported in a number of 
other studies (see e.g. Cunningham and James, 2014; Pennycook, 2013: Rubery and Urwin, 
2011: Rubery et al, 2011) and which highlight a symmetry with the New Right rationales that 
informed the externalisation policies of the Thatcher and Major governments, as well as those 
subsequently pursued by the post-1997 New Labour, Coalition and Conservative 
governments (Thompson, 2007), and the labour market reforms that were introduced to 
support them, such as the Fair Wages Resolution (Bercusson, 1978), and the repeal of 
schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 (Wood, 1978). 
The article also contributes to the literature by providing some judgement regarding 
which of these factors (market or regulation) is most influential in terms of determining 
these outcomes. The findings obtained illustrate clearly the argument of McKensie and 
Martinez Lucio. Specifically, how governmental processes of marketization encompass 
re-configurations of regulatory roles which act to enhance the positions of some actors 
and reduce those of others.  
Market forces are clearly influential in how local authorities, in shifting from the direct 
delivery to the commissioning of services, acquired an enhanced ability to cut costs in a 
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way that would almost certainly not have been possible with their internal workforce 
given their own collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment. As to the 
case organisations themselves, they, like the voluntary sector as a whole, gained the 
opportunity to expand their activities as care providers. An actor with diminished 
capacity to influence outcomes in the social care market in this environment are trade 
unions in the two case study organisations. Their already fairly weak position is further 
undermined by the same forces that enhance those of funders and providers. 
At the same time the two cases found their freedom to deliver services ± and employ 
staff - in the way they wanted to be more constrained. Here, the day-to-day operation of 
the social care market and the plight of the two case study organisations cannot be 
adequately understood without taking into account how the actions of its participants 
are crucially constrained and facilitated by the surrounding regulatory architecture. 
Thus, at the most basic level, this architecture determines key features of the services to 
be delivered and what organisations and individuals are deemed qualified to deliver 
them. The regulatory architecture further places through best value reviews parameters 
around the price and quality compromises that can be reached by service 
commissioners and providers. Meanwhile, the  scope given to providers to cut their 
employment costs, has to be seen in the context of labour market regulatory changes 
and local authorities not having any legally binding obligations to fully fund service 
delivery on a reasonably long-term basis.  
These observations not only fit well with the arguments of MacKenzie and Martinez 
Lucio but receive reinforcement from recent comparative analyses of the employment-
related effects of public service contracting that show them to vary as a result of 
differences in the way that national frameworks regulate the relevant employment and 
production regimes (Jaehrling, 2015). It seems reasonable to argue therefore that an 
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important function of empirical studies of public service outsourcing should be to 
provide detailed and critical examinations of  the influence exerted by such regulatory 
infrastructures and how they can potentially be better designed to support the 
achievement of intended, and important, social objectives. That is to move beyond a 
focus on how organisations respond to surrounding regulatory contexts to engage with 
the appropriateness of them (see e.g. Rubery and Irwin, 2011: 135).  
 
This last point is especially important because the evidence presented here suggests that 
the capacity of local authorities to establish a network of providers that can cut 
employment costs, is leading to concerns about their ability to maintain service quality 
in the face of resulting recruitment and retention problems, rising workloads and 
growing staff discontent.  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the work of Mackenzie and Martinez, this paper has used two longitudinal case 
studies of voluntary organisations engaged in the provision of adult social care to examine the 
argument that processes of public service outsourcing are best conceptualised DVµUHJXODWRU\¶, 
as well as µPDUNHW¶, phenomenon. In each of the organisations studied, it was found that 
contracting relationships had become more cost-based and insecure, to have generated 
funding difficulties and prompted adverse changes to the employment conditions of staff. It 
was also apparent that these outcomes had very much stemmed from the funding pressures 
local authorities were under and the capacity they had to pass these on to voluntary sector 
providers. At the same time, however, it was further clear that these market-related dynamics 
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were intimately connected to key features of the surrounding regulatory infrastructure and to 
largely be derived from them. As a result, the obtained findings are seen to add weight to the 
view that the operation of such outsourcing markets cannot be fully understood without due 
regard being paid to the nature and influence of the meta-frameworks of regulation 
underlying their creation and operation.  
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Table 1: Interviewing schedule 
Organisation 2002 2009 2011 2014 
Case 1 HR Manager 
and Contracts 
Manager 
HR Manager 
Senior 
Operational 
Manager 
HR Manager 
and Senior 
Operational 
Manager 
HR Manager 
Case 2 HR Assistant, 
HR Manager, 
Finance Director 
& Contracts 
Manager 
HR Manager, 
Senior 
Operational 
Manager 
HR Manager, 
Senior (2 
interviews) 
Operational 
Manager 
HR Manager 
Senior 
operational 
manager 
 
Table 2: Impact of deregulation - Case 1 
1999 - 2002 Move away from public sector pay scales for all employees.  
Pay freeze until 2001 
Increase working week from 39  ? 40 hours. 
2002 - 2006 Award of regular cost of living increases in pay equivalent to percentage rises in 
local authorities. 
Maternity and Paternity provisions above statutory minimum 
Reduction of the working week to 38 hours. 
New levels of pension entitlement for new starts. 
2006 - 2009 Reductions in sickness benefits 
Further changes to pensions introducing new tier of employer contribution for 
new starts 
Pay freeze for year 2009/10. 
2010 - 2013 Re-grading of management roles and compulsory redundancies. 
Removal of pay increments at top of support worker grade. 
ZĞĚƵĐŝŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌ ‘ƐůĞĞƉŽǀĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚĂĨĨ ? 
Raising working week with no additional pay to 39 hours. 
Recruiting support assistants 
Return to statutory maternity and paternity provision. 
Cuts in non-statutory training events. 
Workers prepare for training in their own time. 
2014 
onwards 
Fears of skill shortages and poaching of skilled front-line staff. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Impact of deregulation  - Case 2 
1999 - 2002 Pay and conditions aligned to local authority scales. Delays in pay rises due to 
protracted negotiations with funders. Efficiencies from recruitment freezes or 
redeployment of management roles. 
2006 - 2009 Best value reviews leading to closure of two services and redundancies. 
Senior management discussions regarding moving away from public sector pay 
scales, and introducing support assistants. 
2010 - 2013 2010  ? Non replacement of staff that leave.  
No compulsory redundancies. 
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Recruitment of support assistants.  
Pay freeze for two years. 
Cut to life and permanent health insurance. 
Sickness benefits reduced. 
Reductions in nightshift and on-call payments. 
Training limited to statutory requirements 
2011  ? Re-grading of support work staff to support assistant level with 
accompanying pay reductions. 
Re-grading of layer of front-line managers with accompanying pay reductions. 
Redundancies in HR, Finance and information technology. 
2014 onwards Inability to comply with Scottish Living Wage 
Emerging recruitment problems in areas where business experienced growth. 
Increase in job insecurity linked to individualised funding. 
Threats of redundancies to HR, marketing, finance and administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
